The Smudged Serpent Slithers Through Policy Circles
- Javier Conejo del Cerro
- 6 nov
- 3 Min. de lectura
The SmudgedSerpent cluster emerged in mid-2025, weaving itself quietly into the inboxes of U.S. academics and foreign policy experts focused on Iran. Operating during a period of heightened tension between Iran and Israel, the serpent did not strike loudly. Instead, it waited, observed, and moved delicately—approaching its prey through trust, familiarity, and conversation. This was not a mass phishing blast but a deliberate, intelligence-driven hunt designed to infiltrate minds before machines.
The objective was clear: collect insight into U.S. strategic thinking, Iran’s geopolitical posture, military transformation, and regional policy implications, particularly among researchers close to Washington’s analytic nerve centers.
Phase 1: The Serpent Approaches the Nest
The campaign began with conversational phishing—emails written in a tone of collegial inquiry rather than urgency or coercion.
Messages impersonated policy researchers, think-tank fellows, and analysts associated with institutions such as the Brookings Institution and the Washington Institute. These emails were plausible, restrained, and polite—designed to make targets lower their guard by recognizing the social ecosystem they live in.
Many messages referenced:
Iranian domestic political shifts
IRGC militarization
Regional security implications
Joint research opportunities or invitations to briefings
In several cases, the attackers even engaged in multiple message exchanges before introducing any link, demonstrating patience and situational awareness—a hallmark of state-backed intelligence operations.
Phase 2: The Venom Enters the Bloodstream
Once rapport was established, the serpent revealed its fangs.
The vector of entry relied on credential harvesting and remote access deployment.
Two primary infection chains were identified:
Credential Theft via Fake Login Pages Victims were sent links to documents supposedly for upcoming discussions. These links redirected to spoofed Microsoft login pages crafted to harvest:
Microsoft account passwords
Session cookies
Authentication tokens
Remote Access via MSI + RMM Deployment In some cases, the link delivered a ZIP archive with an MSI installer disguised as Microsoft Teams. When executed, it installed legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools:
PDQ Connect
ISL Online (in some cases)
Because these tools are legitimate and signed, endpoint defenses often ignored them—allowing persistent remote access and hands-on-keyboard operation inside the victim’s system.
Data Stolen
Once inside, SmudgedSerpent exfiltrated:
Microsoft credentials
Policy research documents
Email correspondence and notes
Session tokens for continuous access
Potential contact network mapping data
This was espionage, not financial extortion.
Phase 3: The Serpent Coils and Watches
The campaign did not seek disruption.
It sought long-term, silent visibility.
SmudgedSerpent’s behavior aligns with prior Iran-aligned intelligence clusters such as:
TA455 (Smoke Sandstorm / UNC1549)
TA453 (Charming Kitten / Mint Sandstorm)
TA450 (MuddyWater / Mango Sandstorm)
But SmudgedSerpent demonstrates refinement:
More precise target selection
Higher-quality impersonation tradecraft
Greater comfort maintaining dialogue over time
This reflects an evolution in Iran’s cyber-espionage capability, shifting from broad credential harvesting toward strategic policy intelligence collection.
Phase 4: The Serpent’s Tracks Are Subtle, But Not Invisible
Defending against SmudgedSerpent requires recognizing the human layer of the intrusion.
This is not a malware-first attack.
It is relationship-first.
Thus, technical controls must be paired with diplomatic awareness inside research and academic settings.
Defensive Measures (The Snake Trap)
While the body of the blog avoids bullet points, the mitigation phase traditionally uses them, so we maintain that structure:
Verify sender identity on unsolicited research or collaboration emails
Require MFA for all Microsoft and cloud accounts
Monitor browser-based login flows and unusual authentication locations
Restrict or alert on RMM tool installation and execution
Use EDR/XDR to detect beaconing and remote-control sessions
Train research staff to recognize conversational phishing
SmudgedSerpent is not a one-off intrusion.
It is a method, and the method works because the academic and policy ecosystem relies on:
Trust
Collegial exchange
Shared intellectual purpose
The serpent knows this and it will return, refined and patient, to environments where ideas move more freely than credentials. The defense, therefore, must be equally aware:
Security culture must become part of research culture. Until then, the serpent waits.
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