The Scorpion Strikes: Airstalk and the Silent MDM Breach
- Javier Conejo del Cerro
- 3 nov 2025
- 3 Min. de lectura
A new state-backed cyber-espionage cluster, tracked as CL-STA-1009, has emerged from the digital desert, bringing with it a sophisticated malware family named Airstalk. This campaign—believed to stem from a nation-state supply-chain compromise—demonstrates how trusted enterprise infrastructure can be turned into a stealthy weapon.
Built in PowerShell and .NET, Airstalk manipulates the AirWatch / Workspace ONE Unified Endpoint Management (UEM) API to establish covert command-and-control (C2) channels, disguising exfiltration as normal device management traffic. By leveraging a stolen certificate, the attackers validated their malicious binaries, allowing the sting to pass unnoticed through corporate defenses.
Phase 1: Scorpion in the Sand — The Initial Infiltration
Like a scorpion buried under the dunes, CL-STA-1009 conceals its entry in legitimate processes. The attack is believed to begin through a supply-chain breach or trusted vendor compromise, targeting organizations integrated with AirWatch / Workspace ONE for mobile or endpoint management. Once within these environments, Airstalk abuses the /api/mdm/devices/ endpoint—normally used for legitimate device queries—to masquerade its commands as harmless API traffic.
Through this covert channel, the malware creates a C2 connection disguised as MDM communication, exploiting custom attributes and blob uploads to store or transmit stolen data. Because this traffic blends with genuine MDM operations, traditional network defenses rarely flag it as malicious.
Phase 2: Piercing with the Sting — Command and Control
Once the scorpion’s stinger pierces the system, Airstalk establishes a multi-threaded backdoor capable of issuing complex ACTIONS: taking screenshots, retrieving Chrome and Island browser data, listing user directories, and exfiltrating files. The malware communicates through an adaptive message sequence—CONNECT, CONNECTED, ACTIONS, RESULT—that mirrors legitimate service exchanges.
The PowerShell variant relies on scheduled tasks for persistence, while the .NET version expands capabilities with new message types such as PING, MISMATCH, and DEBUG, using three independent threads to manage tasks, beaconing, and data transfer. Each thread operates autonomously, maintaining stealth and continuity even under partial system lockdown.
By embedding its C2 within MDM APIs, the scorpion hides its movement inside trusted corridors, bypassing detection tools that assume vendor traffic is safe.
Phase 3: Feeding on Prey — The Victims and Data Exfiltration
The victims of Airstalk’s sting are primarily enterprises managing large device fleets, BPO service providers, and third-party contractors tied to corporate MDM ecosystems. Admins and remote users unknowingly sustain the scorpion, as Airstalk collects browser histories, credentials, session cookies, and bookmarks from Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Island browsers.
The attackers then use AirWatch’s blob storage feature to upload this stolen data, exfiltrating it under the guise of device backups or metadata synchronization. The use of a legitimate, likely stolen certificate further disguises these transfers as authentic enterprise operations, enabling prolonged access and lateral movement within high-value environments.
Phase 4: The Desert Trap — Defensive Measures
Airstalk’s use of trusted APIs, stolen certificates, and legitimate vendor channels marks a new evolution in supply-chain espionage. Defenders must respond by shifting visibility deeper into integrated services that traditionally escape scrutiny.
Organizations should:
Restrict and continuously monitor MDM API and blob activity, flagging abnormal attribute usage.
Audit vendor integrations to ensure least-privilege access and prevent shadow communications.
Rotate tokens, certificates, and keys regularly to invalidate long-term persistence.
Segment and sandbox external vendor connections, especially those with MDM privileges.
Deploy EDR/XDR and SIEM correlation rules capable of detecting anomalous MDM behavior.
Reassess supply-chain exposure, focusing on third-party service providers within endpoint management ecosystems.
Airstalk exemplifies a strategic leap in state-sponsored tradecraft—weaponizing legitimate enterprise APIs to embed espionage within the operational heartbeat of organizations. Its success lies not in brute force, but in trust exploitation: blending seamlessly with sanctioned traffic, feeding on overlooked telemetry, and surviving inside the most protected corporate perimeters.
For defenders, the lesson is clear: the next supply-chain intrusion may not arrive through code repositories or malicious updates, but through trusted cloud interfaces already embedded in daily operations.
To survive in this desert, visibility must go where the scorpion walks—into the sand beneath trusted systems.
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