ShadowV2 floods AWS Docker
- Javier Conejo del Cerro
- 23 sept
- 2 Min. de lectura
The ShadowV2 botnet represents the latest evolution in cybercrime-as-a-service, flooding the “warehouse” of Amazon Web Services (AWS) by hijacking misconfigured Docker daemons on EC2 instances. While AWS itself remains intact, exposed Docker environments have been conscripted into a DDoS-for-hire network. ShadowV2 combines advanced exploitation with brute containerization tactics, unleashing HTTP/2 Rapid Reset floods, Cloudflare bypass techniques, and massive traffic waves that transform legitimate cloud resources into rented weapons of disruption.
Phase 1: Breach through the container door
The entry vector lies in Docker APIs left exposed to the internet without authentication. ShadowV2 operators used a Python-based spreader to scan for misconfigured endpoints, focusing on EC2 environments where Docker is often deployed for development, CI/CD, or production workloads. Once identified, attackers spawned setup containers, installed utilities, and prepared the ground for a persistent foothold. Unlike other botnets that simply dropped pre-built images from Docker Hub, ShadowV2 built images directly on the victim machine, minimizing forensic traces and complicating detection.
Phase 2: RAT deployment and command beaconing
From the setup container, attackers launched a Go-based ELF RAT designed for both persistence and flexibility. This malware beaconed periodically to a FastAPI-based command-and-control (C2) server, hidden behind Cloudflare to mask infrastructure origins. The RAT received instructions for DDoS operations, while also exfiltrating sensitive data: configuration files, environment variables, network details, and API keys. These stolen secrets were later weaponized, enabling further misuse of the compromised environments.
Phase 3: Weaponization of AWS fleets
With infected containers under their control, ShadowV2 operators transformed cloud resources into attack nodes for hire. The platform exposed a user panel where customers could log in, configure campaigns, and even exclude sites from targeting. Capabilities included:
HTTP/2 Rapid Reset floods, far more disruptive than traditional floods.
Cloudflare bypass tricks, leveraging ChromeDP to solve JavaScript challenges and obtain clearance cookies.
Massive HTTP floods, overwhelming targeted servers at scale.
Through this modular design, ShadowV2 blurred the line between botnet and commercial DDoS-for-hire service, offering tailored attack functionality with a polished interface.
Phase 4: Long-term risks and stealth tactics
Beyond DDoS, the compromise left organizations dangerously exposed. The Go RAT gave operators command execution capabilities, meaning victims weren’t just temporary “attack nodes” but potential stepping stones for deeper intrusions. By leveraging containerization, segmented APIs, and stealth beaconing, ShadowV2 minimized its footprint while maximizing operational flexibility. Cloudflare proxying, FastAPI endpoints, and randomized container deployments gave the campaign resilience against takedowns.
ShadowV2 is a reminder of how exposed cloud services can be weaponized at scale when misconfigured. Organizations that rely on AWS EC2 with Docker cannot assume safety by default — one overlooked daemon can turn enterprise infrastructure into a weapon-for-rent.
To blunt campaigns like ShadowV2, defenders should:
Lock down Docker APIs and require strict authentication.
Restrict EC2 security groups to prevent exposed services.
Continuously monitor for rogue or unexpected containers.
Detect anomalous HTTP/2 Rapid Reset traffic and Cloudflare bypass attempts.
Rotate credentials, API keys, and environment variables regularly.
Segment workloads to minimize the blast radius of any compromise.
Employ professional DDoS mitigation services to absorb attacks.
ShadowV2 illustrates the convergence of cloud exploitation and cybercrime-as-a-service: a scalable, modular attack platform built on hijacked resources. For defenders, vigilance in configuration, visibility across workloads, and layered mitigation remain the only way to prevent your AWS warehouse from being flooded.
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