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PHALT#BLYX: Fake Booking Cancellations and the Blue Screen Trap

  • Foto del escritor: Javier  Conejo del Cerro
    Javier Conejo del Cerro
  • hace 2 días
  • 3 Min. de lectura

In late December 2025, researchers uncovered a coordinated malware campaign targeting the European hospitality sector through fake Booking.com cancellation emails and a deceptive “Blue Screen of Death” (BSoD) recovery flow. Tracked as PHALT#BLYX, the operation combines social engineering, psychological pressure, and living-off-the-land techniques to trick hotel staff into executing malicious commands themselves, ultimately deploying DCRat, a powerful remote access trojan. Rather than relying on exploits, the attackers weaponize trust in well-known booking platforms and native Windows tools to establish stealthy, persistent access to hotel systems during peak business periods.


Victims — Hospitality Staff Under Pressure


The campaign is tightly focused on European hotels, hostels, inns, and hospitality businesses, with a particular emphasis on employees in reservations, front desk, finance, and administrative roles. These users are routinely exposed to booking changes and cancellations and are therefore primed to react quickly to urgent reservation-related emails. The phishing messages frequently reference unexpected reservation cancellations with charges exceeding €1,000, deliberately designed to trigger stress and rapid action. The consistent use of euro-denominated amounts and the timing during busy travel seasons indicate deliberate targeting of European hospitality operations when staff workload and response urgency are at their highest.


Breach Method — ClickFix, Fake BSoD, and DCRat Deployment


The intrusion chain begins with a phishing email impersonating Booking.com, warning of a reservation cancellation and urging the recipient to click a link for confirmation. That link leads to a fake Booking-branded website, which presents a staged sequence of errors: a fake CAPTCHA, a browser message claiming the page is loading too slowly, and finally a fake Blue Screen of Death.

The bogus BSoD displays “recovery instructions” telling the victim to open the Windows Run dialog and paste a command. By following these steps, the user unknowingly executes a PowerShell dropper that abuses the trusted Windows binary MSBuild.exe to proxy execution of a malicious project file. This living-off-the-land approach allows the malware to evade many traditional security controls.

Once executed, the chain deploys DCRat (DarkCrystal RAT), a modular .NET remote access trojan. The malware configures Microsoft Defender exclusions or disables it entirely, establishes persistence via the Startup folder, and connects to external command-and-control infrastructure. DCRat enables attackers to log keystrokes, steal credentials and clipboard data, execute arbitrary commands, profile the infected system, and deploy additional payloads such as cryptocurrency miners.

Multiple indicators suggest a Russian nexus: Russian-language strings within MSBuild project files, infrastructure geolocated to Russia, and the widespread availability of DCRat within Russian underground forums. While direct attribution remains cautious, the technical and contextual evidence strongly aligns the activity with Russian threat actors.


Measures to Fend Off the Attack — Breaking the Chain


To reduce exposure to campaigns like PHALT#BLYX, hospitality organizations should prioritize the following controls:

  • Harden email security to detect booking-themed phishing and domain impersonation attempts

  • Train staff to never execute commands or “fix instructions” delivered via email or websites

  • Restrict or monitor PowerShell and MSBuild.exe usage, especially from user contexts

  • Monitor changes to Microsoft Defender exclusions and unexpected Defender disablement

  • Detect persistence mechanisms such as new entries in Startup folders

  • Enforce least-privilege access and prevent unnecessary administrative rights


PHALT#BLYX demonstrates how modern malware delivery no longer depends on exploiting software flaws, but on exploiting human behavior and operational pressure. By disguising malware execution as a routine troubleshooting step during a booking workflow, attackers achieve deep, persistent access before defenses can react. For hospitality organizations, the lesson is clear: trust in familiar platforms and native system tools has become a primary attack surface, and defending it requires equal attention to user behavior, endpoint controls, and execution monitoring.



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